Why the Tariff Provisions in the American Clean Energy & Security Act (ACESA) Will Survive
I previously wrote that the Obama Administration should back off its opposition to language in Waxman-Markey that imposes a tariff on imports from countries that do not require equivalent levels of GHG emissions reductions. This tariff provision is the only effective way to discourage US businesses from moving production overseas to countries with less stringent climate change laws, thereby defeating the goals of cap-and-trade by emitting over there what they cannot emit here. Opponents to the tariff provision claim that the bill's generous allocation of free emission allowances compensates firms for this disparity and thereby levels the playing field so that competitors in foreign countries lacking carbon emission controls do not enjoy a competitive advantage over carbon-capped US businesses.
That explanation, however, doesn't really wash. A large percentage of the allocations are to be doled out to electricity distributors that cannot move operations offshore and do not face foreign competition here. This allocation to the electricity wholesalers has nothing to do with leveling the playing field with competitors in foreign countries that do not control GHG emissions. It has to do with easing transition to a carbon constrained economy, deferring the impact so that industry can survive the move to a low-carbon economy.
Apparently, 10 Senate Democrats agree -- they have sent President Obama a letter stating that a "longer-term border adjustment mechanism is a vital part of this package to prevent the relocation of carbon emissions and industries" to countries that do not likewise cap GHG emissions. The legislation will not pass without them. I'm betting the tariff provision survives.
Don't Yank the Tariff Provisions from the House Climate Change Bill
President Obama deserves a share of the credit for the historic vote by the House June 26 to pass the first climate change bill. The bill is far from perfect, but it is an important step in the right direction. In comments following the House vote, however, President Obama took a step in the wrong direction. In urging the Senate to swiftly pass their counterpart to the House bill, President Obama raised questions about a provision that would impose a tariff on the import of goods from countries where the cost of such good benefits from weaker climate change laws:
"At a time when the economy worldwide is still deep in recession and we've seen a significant drop in global trade, I think we have to be very careful about sending any protectionist signals out there….I think we're going to have to do a careful analysis to determine whether the prospects of tariffs are necessary, given all the other stuff that was done and had been negotiated on behalf of energy-intensive industries."
Removing the tariff provision from the bill would give its opponents a strong argument for its defeat. Opponents argue that by imposing what they classify as an exorbitant energy tax on products such as steel, cement and chemicals the climate bill would simply force manufacturers to shift production to foreign countries with more favorable energy costs, resulting in no net reduction of greenhouse gas emissions AND loss of jobs in the US.
This is a potent argument which, if left unanswered, could doom the bill in the Senate. Although President Obama suggested that there may be better alternatives to the "protectionist" provision in the House bill he did not elaborate on them. One alternative that has received some favorable press is the so-called "sectoral approach" in which certain energy-intensive industries seek to reach agreement on a global standard for GHG emissions from facilities in the sector.
Although the sectoral approach is arguably sound in principle, the fear is that in practice the affected sectors would be able to push through weak standards which undermine the battle against global warming. It is almost like begging the fox to guard the henhouse. Another alternative would allow the United States to scrap its cap-and-trade system if China and India do not adopt similar programs. This avoids the fox/henhouse problem, but creates a bigger one: in effect, it cedes to foreign countries the decision of whether WE should combat climate change. The House approach avoids both problems, and should be followed in the Senate.
