Don't Yank the Tariff Provisions from the House Climate Change Bill
President Obama deserves a share of the credit for the historic vote by the House June 26 to pass the first climate change bill. The bill is far from perfect, but it is an important step in the right direction. In comments following the House vote, however, President Obama took a step in the wrong direction. In urging the Senate to swiftly pass their counterpart to the House bill, President Obama raised questions about a provision that would impose a tariff on the import of goods from countries where the cost of such good benefits from weaker climate change laws:
"At a time when the economy worldwide is still deep in recession and we've seen a significant drop in global trade, I think we have to be very careful about sending any protectionist signals out there….I think we're going to have to do a careful analysis to determine whether the prospects of tariffs are necessary, given all the other stuff that was done and had been negotiated on behalf of energy-intensive industries."
Removing the tariff provision from the bill would give its opponents a strong argument for its defeat. Opponents argue that by imposing what they classify as an exorbitant energy tax on products such as steel, cement and chemicals the climate bill would simply force manufacturers to shift production to foreign countries with more favorable energy costs, resulting in no net reduction of greenhouse gas emissions AND loss of jobs in the US.
This is a potent argument which, if left unanswered, could doom the bill in the Senate. Although President Obama suggested that there may be better alternatives to the "protectionist" provision in the House bill he did not elaborate on them. One alternative that has received some favorable press is the so-called "sectoral approach" in which certain energy-intensive industries seek to reach agreement on a global standard for GHG emissions from facilities in the sector.
Although the sectoral approach is arguably sound in principle, the fear is that in practice the affected sectors would be able to push through weak standards which undermine the battle against global warming. It is almost like begging the fox to guard the henhouse. Another alternative would allow the United States to scrap its cap-and-trade system if China and India do not adopt similar programs. This avoids the fox/henhouse problem, but creates a bigger one: in effect, it cedes to foreign countries the decision of whether WE should combat climate change. The House approach avoids both problems, and should be followed in the Senate.
Why the House is Off on Offsets
So the House of Representatives won’t go carbon neutral, after all. Its decision could portend poor treatment for carbon offsets in the upcoming debate over climate change legislation.
The House’s decision came after its leadership dropped an essential part of the plan to purchase carbon offsets. The House reportedly paid $89,000 for offsets from the Chicago Climate Exchange to cover its 2007/2008 emissions. (Most of those emissions come from steam heat generated by the ancient coal-burning Capitol Power Plant that inspired a protest Monday, hailed the largest act of civil disobedience against coal.)
The House’s decision appears to be rooted in a misunderstanding of offsets. Leaders are uncomfortable with them, according to the Post, because "the money was funneled to [offset projects] that had been completed before the House paid a cent." The Post continues: "Experts said those issues make it hard to say that the House's money had caused the environmental benefits the chamber paid for." Rep. Dan Lungren (R-CA) is quoted as saying, "Maybe they're admitting that what we did [in purchasing offsets] was actually nothing."
This reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of offsets and how they work.
The conceptual advance of the offset is that it commodifies an emissions reduction.
It entices the entity reducing emissions with the prospect of creating a commodity that will be worth more than the cost of actually reducing the emissions. As a result, you have a lot of people investing in emissions reductions projects and “banking” the offsets they create. Why? Because they believe the price of that reduction will be worth more in the future than it is today. Or they may sell it to someone else who wants to hold it.
That, in a nutshell, is the "trade" part of cap-and-trade works, and it is the mechanism that allows the profit motive to drive carbon reductions.
The House appears to be struggling with this basic logic and that should worry offset advocates in the coming debate over climate change legislation.
Congress in 2008
Federal climate change legislation may be on the way. The Senate has targeted a vote in June, and the House by the end of the year, although a bill both chambers can agree upon is unlikely until 2009, if then. It would be a great mistake, however, to view 2008 as a lost year on the climate front. The fundamental elements of Senate and House bills will be debated and accessible to all who probe beneath the surface. The fundamental regulatory structure and economic impact of climate legislation will have been thrashed over thoroughly by the end of the year. To interested stakeholders, the time to weigh in is now. [summary]
While the candidates count delegates, key Senators and Members count votes and try to predict how far toward climate legislation the Congress will progress this year. The short answer: final legislation is not likely this year, although both chambers may come very close. Because the Senate has targeted a vote in June, and the House by the end of the year, it would be a great mistake to view 2008 as a lost year on the climate front, however. To get to these votes, or even to try to get legislation in shape for a vote, means that the fundamental elements of the Senate and House bills will be debated and visible to all who probe beneath the surface. Passage is quite likely in 2009, but the fundamental regulatory structure and economic impact of climate legislation will have been thrashed over thoroughly. The Congress in 2009 will not by any means be writing on a clean slate. To interested stakeholders, the time to weigh in is now – if not already past.
In the Senate, Senator Lieberman optimistically reports that he believes a vote would be veto-proof at sixty votes if the June vote occurs after the Lieberman-Warner bill reaches the Senate floor soon after the Memorial Day recess. But approval may falter if the many amendments Senators are likely to seek come into play. To reach the 60-vote total, the co-sponsors may have to agree to amendments that, while attracting support from fence-sitting senators, may cause others thought safely on board to fall off the fence. Thus, for the US Senate to approve a strong bill this year, the managers will have to walk a fine line from here on out.
Does Senator John McCain support the bill? His support for decisive action on climate is well-documented. But his desire and determination for a role for nuclear power in addressing the climate challenge may place a serious obstacle in the path of approval, because many "climate senators," including the Chair of the Committee on Environment and Public Works that has favorably reported out the Lieberman-Warner bill, Barbara Boxer of California, have expressed opposition to inclusion of incentives for nuclear power. When other ticklish issues are added to the long list of amendment-prone provisions, the prospects for passage this session look decidedly less optimistic.
In the House, Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and special climate committee chair Edward Markey (D-MA) were not joking when on April Fools Day they expressed their determination to have climate legislation pass the House by the end of the year. But they have complicated their own task by stressing the importance of including India and China in climate solutions. Strictly speaking, there is no role for addressing these two nations' large GHG emissions totals in domestic US climate legislation; Pelosi and Markey are hoping that India and China will be addressed either through the Kyoto agreement process or through the time-tried pathway of bilateral agreements. But bringing up India and China, the twin Achilles' Heels of climate action, the two members appeared to be drawing attention to their critics' strongest reason for avoiding unilateral US action until the largest global emitters are brought into some sort of accord on joint action.
The issues to be addressed in a domestic climate law are truly daunting, and suggest that next calendar year, after the presidential election, is a more likely time to expect climate legislation for the US. Even then, the challenge cannot be overstated. The issues include negotiating out provisions to cover caps and baselines fairly and effectively, with key decisions to be made about how each plant, company, sector, and state will be expected to comply, not to mention vital assumptions going into a domestic framework regarding the limits to be placed on GHG emissions for the nation and the planet. Baselines need to be set, and the effects of mergers, acquisitions, and corporate reorganizations taken fairly into account. These issues exist even before taking up the much-discussed topic of the role trading/banking/offsets will play, especially vis-a-vis Clean Air Act-California AB 32-style performance standards. One of the very largest and most contentious areas will cover congressional decisions – no doubt after fierce lobbying – of the impact of legislation on different economic sectors (transportation, chemicals, manufacturing, not to mention electrical utilities and fuels production and consumption). In this connection, legislation can be made (or derailed) by proposed provisions regarding phase-in, byes and safety valves, and cost-spreading.
Allocating emissions allowances is about as controversial as the new legislation can possibly become, with major debate about the grandfathering existing sources, whether to auction all or just some of the rights to emit, and allowance retirement. After both creating enormous value in the form of legislative permission to emit GHGs, and auctioning or allocating the newly-minted rights to emit, already it is clear that a large federal direct and indirect subsidy program will be launched, that may favor green technology and conservation and disfavor existing unaltered high-GHG emitting technologies. Early action credits will certainly receive attention, but to what extent and in what form? This has yet to be fully resolved, nor has the point at which allowance purchase may finally be set to occur: upstream/downstream, at the point of energy use or the point of carbon release.